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R.EcuLATION OF BusINEss-ANTrrRusT LAw AS AFFECTED BY
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA v. UNITED STATES-Contracts limiting the right of a purchaser to use or deal in the goods of a
competitor of the seller are familiar both to the businessman and to the
courts. As a general rule, they take one of two forms. The first is a
"tying contract," where the one product of the seller is sold or leased
only on condition that the buyer take a certain quantity of other
products, or that no products of another seller be used in conjunction
with it. The other is an exclusive dealing contract, in which the purchaser agrees not to use or deal in any goods except those furnished
by the seller, the seller in return usually promising to furnish the buyer
hls requirements of the product for the term of the contract. The
economic value of such contracts in obtaining and preserving a market
for the manufacturer or wholesaler on the one hand, and providing the
buyer an assured supply on the other, are apparent. But they are also
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peculiarly adapted to misuse for the restraining of competition. This
adaptability, and the exploitation thereof, led to the enactment of
section 3 of the Clayton Act, which provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ...
to lease or make a sale or contract for sale . . . on the condition,
agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, ... or other commodities
of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition,
agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."1
It can easily be seen that the major problem of interpretation of this
statute is found in the qualifying condition. In what circumstances
will contracts be held to be such as "may substantially lessen competition"?
In Standard Oil Company of California v. United States,2 the
Supreme Court of the United States has given what appears to be a
final and definitive answer to this question, although differing from
what had formerly been thought to be the "final and definite answer."
This comment will be centered on that case and its implications.

A. The Standard Oil Case
The Standard Oil Company of California is the leading California
producer of gasoline, marketing all types of petroleum and petroleum
products, together with automobile accessories, throughout a sevenstate area. The greater part of this production is for sale for automotive
use. During its business history, Standard has used three main types
of marketing devices for these sales: agency contracts with independently operated service stations, company-owned stations,3 and exclusive
supply contracts with independently operated stations. The use of this
last method was commenced in 1934, and by 1938 had completely
supplanted the agency system. Standard now has 16% of the independent stations in the area under these contracts. Some contracts cover
gasoline only, while others cover one or more of the other Standard
products as well. In 1946, Standard's sales through the exclusive agreements totalled $57,646,233, this total being 6.7% of the total taxable
13s Stat. L. 731, §3 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §14.
337 U.S. 293, 69 S.Ct. 1051 (1949).
These stations were owned through Standard Stations, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Standard of California, and co-defendant in this action.
2
3
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gallonage sold in the area by all producers. Sales of gas, oil and
accessories by this .means have remained at a roughly constant proportion of the area's total sales for the period 1936-46. Its total sales by
all methods for 1946 were 23% of the total taxable gallonage. Standard's six major competitors all use similar contracts, selling 42.5%
of the total in 1946.
In 1948, the district court in California issued an injunction against
the enforcement and entering into of these contracts, on the grounds
that they were in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act, in that they
affected a substantial amount of commerce. The court refused to
hear evidence as to the actual status of competitive activity or the probable result of these contracts as used in the industry, predicating its
finding that they "may substantially lessen competition" solely on the
size of the business involved.4
On appeal, tlie issue was phrased: "whether the requirement of
showing that the effect of the agreements 'may be to substantially lessen
competition' may be met simply by proof that a substantial portion of
commerce is affected or whether it must also be demonstrated that
competitive activity has actually diminished or probably will diminish."5
The answer to this was based chieB.y on grounds of difficulty of proof.
The Court first pointed out that this "substantial market" test is the
recognized rule in the cases involving tying agreements, and then goes
on to recognize the difference in the economic benefits to the parties
between the two types of agreements, saying: " . . . pertinent considerations support, certainly as a matter of economic reasoning, varying standards as to each for the proof necessary to fulfill the conditions
of that clause. If this distinction were accepted, various tests of the
economic usefulness or restrictive effect of requirements contracts
would become relevant." 6 But in the last analysis, the Court concluded that the fact that the use of these contracts was widespread in
the industry and that the relative shares of the market had not varied
over the period of use, justified an inference that the maintenance of
market position was due to a foreclosure of the late comers from the
market. The Court continued: "Moreover, to demand that bare
inference be supported by evidence as to what would have happened
but for the adoption of the practice that was in fact adopted or to
4

United States v. Standard Oil Company of California, (D.C. Cal. 1948) 78 F. Supp.

850.
337 U.S. 293 at 299, 69 S.Ct. 1051 (1949).
a Id. at 307-308.

11
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require firm prediction of an increase in competition as a probable
result of ordering the abandonment of the practice, would be a standard
of proof, if not virtually impossible to meet, at least most ill-suited for
ascertainment by courts."7 Because of this dilemma, the final conclusion was that " ... the qualifying clause of § 3 is satisfied by proof that
competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of
commerce affected."8 The majority is reinforced in its desire to avoid
trial of such economic issues by the fact that the Clayton Act, enacted
subsequent to the Sherman Act, was expressly designed to avoid the
undesirable problems of proof posed by the "rule of reason." This
doctrine had emphasized the reasonableness of a given course of action
to attain a business end in itself legitimate, disregarding the more or
less collateral results, with accompanying interest in the subjective
intent of the men engaging in such action.9 The difficulty of proof of
such factors led Congress to single out, in this statute, certain specific
practices-exclusive dealing, price discrimination, and intercorporate
stock ownership-which it deemed most conducive to the establishment
of restraints and monopoly, and subject them to more stringent surveillance than apparently could be had under the Sherman Act.10 One of
the reasons for the present holding is the expressed fear that otherwise
the Clayton Act would cover no more than the Sherman Act.
In view of the small percentage of the total sales of the industry
made through Standard's contracts, of the express admission by the
Court that it cannot be said that Standard occupies a dominant position
in the market, and of the highly competitive history of the industry, it
seems clear that the finding of violation was predicated solely upon the
quantitative volume of business.11
1 Id. at 309-310.
Sid. at 314.
. o Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 at 58-66, 31 S.Ct. 502
(1911). Subjective intent to suppress competition is still regarded as an essential in Sherman
Act prosecutions. United States v. Yellow Cab, 18 U.S. LA.w WEI!K 4040 (1949).
1o S. Rep. 698, 63d Cong., 2d sess. (1914). See also Standard Fashion Company v.
Magrane-Houston Company, 258 U.S. 346, 42 S.Ct. 360 (1922); United Shoe Machinery
Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 42 S.Ct. 363 (1922).
11 Here the writer finds himself in the unfortunate position of contradicting Professor
Louis B. Schwartz, of the University of Pennsylvania. Schwartz, "Potential Impairment of
Competition-The Impact of Standard Oil Company of California v. United States on the
Standard of Legality under The Clayton Act," 98 Umv. PA. L. R:Ev. 10 (1949). Professor
Schwartz interprets the case as holding (1) that the inference of adverse effect on competition
may be drawn from the sole circumstance of defendant's powerful, though not monopolistic,
position in the trade, and (2) that such a defendant cannot justify the employment of prima
facie restrictive devices by evidence purporting to show the non-monopolistic effects or the
business advantages of the practice, and thus amply backed by the authority of Standard
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Justice Douglas was one of the four dissenting justices, a fact
superficially surprising when it is considered that the new test is predicated upon volume of business, and the potential clog on competition
created by the volume. But the reason is to be found in exactly that
theory from which the apparent contradiction arises. Here the Court
was faced with conduct which could be declared illegal only because
of its deleterious effect on competition. In such a situation, Justice
Douglas felt that some consideration should be given to the probable
effect of the decision before it is made. His whole dissent is based on
this approach of weighing alternatives as to their effect on competition.
It seems to predicate legality upon whether the revamped market structure resulting from a finding of illegality will not be more damaging
to the public interest than maintenance of the status quo. In view of
the recent judicial endorsement of bigness and corporate growth embodied in the Columbia Steel case,12 Justice Douglas sees no alternative but that the certain result of the decision will be to drive the major
oil companies into further expansion of their holdings in the retail
field, seeking complete vertical integration to assure themselves the
economic benefits resulting from single-brand stations. This will
necessarily convert thousands of independent small businessmen into
clerks subject to absentee owners, as well as completely terminating
any possibility that the smaller refiners could, by offering concessions
and building up consumer demand, break the hold of the majors upon
the retail outlets. When this is the alternative to .finding the contracts
legal, a contrary finding is nothing more than a further judicial promotion of bigness.13 His opinion here is predicated entirely upon the
probable economic effect of the decision, and must stand or fall with
Fashion Company v. Magrane-Houston Company, 258 U.S. 346, 42 S.Ct. 360 (1922).
While the facts of the case certainly open the way for this holding, the majority opinion of
Justice Frankfurter pays much more attention to the magnitude of the business done through
these contracts than to Standard's position as price leader in the market, and at least seems
to stress the tying agreement cases more than the Standard Fashion case as supplying authority for the holding. Justice Jackson's dissent certainly is predicated upon an interpretation
contrary to that of Professor Schwartz, as he goes so far as to state that the substance of the
holding is that "the requirements contract is per se an illegal one" (at 323 of the principal
case).
12 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948), with
Justice Douglas dissenting. The present dissent is based in large part upon his feeling that
the Columbia decision precludes any effective action on the part of the Government to
prevent vertical integration.
18 " ••• elimination of these requirements contracts sets the stage for Standard and the
other oil companies to build service-station empires of their own•••• [The majority opinion]
is an advisory opinion as well, stating to the oil companies how they can with impunity build
their empires." 337 U.S. 293 at 320, 69 S.Ct. 1051 (1949).
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the accuracy of his prediction. This accuracy is to some extent debatable, as there are alternative courses which the majors may follow. Such
expansion would require the acquisition and staffing of some thousands of service stations over a very large geographical area, by each
company, at the cost of a very considerable amount of capital and for
an unpredictable return. Faced with this prospect, the major oil companies may instead elect to permit the deterioration of their retail
markets and make up any resulting deficit by expansion of their crude
oil market, since that is a field of proportionately larger returns and
the present source of the greater part of their profits.14 Another possibility would be the development of a new marketing device such as a
"superstation" carrying many brands, de-emphasizing the product
differentiation which has been the keynote to retail gas marketing in
the past, and compensating for the decline in revenue by savings in
distribution and advertising costs. However, the best argument against
the approach of Justice Douglas probably remains the essential indefiniteness of the test. It might well be questioned whether the probable
economic result of a change in the existing situation is a proper subject for judicial inquiry, in view of the wide conB.icts of opinion and
many factors of causation possible.15
Justice Jackson wrote the other dissenting opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Vinson and Justice Burton. This dissent was based chiefly upon
the refusal of the trial court to permit the defendant to show that the
contracts involved did not in fact lessen competition, and the substitution, by the majority, of inference for evidence. " ... this arrangement operated on enough commerce to violate the Act, provided its
effects were substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly. But proof of their quantity does not prove that they had
this forbidden quality; and the assumption that they did, without proof,
seems to me unwarranted."16 The inference drawn by the majority is
further criticized as based on a misunderstanding of the use of these
contracts and the competition sought to be safeguarded by the statute.
Competition in the sale of gasoline for consumption in automobiles,
though immediately by the dealers, is still essentially waged by the
producers.
14 BAIN, EcoNoM:ICs oF nm PACIFIC CoAsT PETROLllUM hmusTRY, Part ill, pp. 4-8
(1947).
15 But it would seem to be a factor worthy of consideration by the enforcement agencies.
Cf. Mason, ''The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States," 62 HARv.
L. RBv. 1265, esp. at pp. 1284-85 (1949).
10 337 U.S. 293 at 322, 69 S.Ct. 1051 (1949).
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"[T]he retailer in this industry is only a conduit from the oil fields
to the driver's tank, a means by which the oil companies compete
to get the business of the ultimate consumer-the man in whose
automobile the gas is used .... It does not seem to me inherently
to lessen this real competition when an oil company tries to
establish superior service by providing the consumer with a responsible dealer from which the public can purchase adequate and
timely supplies of oil, gasoline and car accessories of some known
and reliable standard of quality."17
This approach would seem more economically justifiable, involving an
analysis of the market to determine its actual characteristics before
determining what the effects of a given course of action may be. On
such an analysis, the only way contracts of this type could lead to
lessened competition in this field would be by the absorption of an
unreasonable number of retail outlets, thus restricting the practical
availability of the consumer market. This, of course, would restore the
necessity of evidence on economic issues, with the resulting uncertainty
feared by the majority. An additional drawback is that the act was
set up to stop menacing activities in their inception. A test giving too
much weight to past history may overlook the actual present inHuence
or trend of a given practice until after it has manifested itself by
irreparable injury to the competitive situation.
B.

Effect on Section 3
The effect of this statute has largely been concentrated on two
types of contracts-"tying" agreements and exclusive dealing contracts.
They are similar in that both are "devices by which a seller reaches
forward in the productive or distributive process to control business
policies at subsequent stages for its own benefit,"18 and to some extent
operate to limit the access of competitors to the market. However, there
are vast differences in the economic utility of the two "devices." The
one purpose of tying contracts is to expand legitimately acquired market
control in one field to another, and the effect is to enable one product
to ride on the economic desirability of another, the seller acquiring by
his superiority in one line an unfair competitive advantage in others.19
11 Id.

at 323.

1s Mn.um, UNFAIR CoMPBnnoN 194 (1941).
19 "In the final analysis any attempt to tie one commodity to another in selling either
of them is fundamentally unfair. It makes the sale of the subsidiazy article depend upon the
tying clause instead of its own merits. • • • The very existence of sucli restrictions suggests
that in its absence a competing article of equal or better quality would be offered at the same
or at a lower price; necessarily so, for otherwise there would be no occasion for the restriction."
VAUGHAN, EcoNoMics OP Omt PATilNT SYSTEM 127 (1925).
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The argument that they are necessary to assure proper working aids for
the basic machine, and thereby protect the seller's good will, has met
with scant approval from either economists or judges, the observation
being made that the same effect can be obtained by a stipulation for
minimum standards of quality.20 Exclusive dealing contracts, on the
other hand, have considerable value to the businessman beyond the
possibilities of suppression of competition.21 The advantages from the
seller's viewpoint, such as closer control of distribution, are numerous.
This control enables the producer to prevent the use of sales methods
damaging to product reputation, and also to predict future demand with
greater accuracy. Among other benefits are active sales efforts by the
retailer directed specifically at his product and carried on in close
collaboration with area-wide promotions, and lower unit selling expense
resulting from the smaller number of customers and ease of selection
of good credit risks. From the buyer's viewpoint there are similar
advantages. One of his principal objectives is the obtaining of an
assured, reliable source of supply, with an accompanying freedom from
the necessity of large inventories. Others include advantages in buying
stemming from concentrated purchasing power and improved credit
terms, potential financial assistance from the seller if needed; and the
ability to engage in local advertising without the danger that his competitors will gain from his efforts. This method of marketing is effective
only when the product is differentiated from others of a similar type
and is most valuable when used by a new producer to break into an
established industry. In such a situation, it is recognized as a means of
encouraging competition.22
The difference between the two types of contracts has hitherto
been recognized by the courts. Tying agreements have been uniformly
20 International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 56 S.Ct.
701 (1936); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947);
VAUGHAN, EcoNOMICS OF Otm PATENT SYSTEM 127 et seq. (1925). The fact that one or
both machines are patented does not affect the legality of the arrangement. United Shoe
Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 42 S.Ct. 363 (1922); Radio Corp. of
America v. Lord, (C.C.A. 3d, 1928) 28 F. (2d) 257, cert. den. 278 U.S. 648, 49 S.Ct. 83
(1928).
21 N.Y. UNIV. Btm. OF BusINEss R:ssBARcH, THB ExcLusIVE AGENCY (1923); PHILLIPS AND DUNCAN, MArua!TING 638-40 (1948); Stockhausen, "The Commercial and AntiTrust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts," 23 N.Y. Umv. L. Q. R:sv. 412 (1948).
22 Stockhausen, "The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts," 23 N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. R:sv. 412, 424-28 (1948). See also Excelsior Motor Mfg. &
Supply Co. v. Sound Equipment, Inc., (C.C.A. 7th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 725, cert. den. 294
U.S. 706, 55 S.Ct. 352 (1935); B.S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 7th, 1923)
292F. 720.

1950]

COMMENTS

513

denounced as illegal. While most of the cases involving such contracts have also involved some degree of market dominance, the latest
cases have not stressed this as too important a factor. The origin of the
rule adopted in the Standard Oil case is found in International Salt
Co. v. United States. 23 The defendant in that action held patents on
two machines designed for the utilization of salt products, and inserted
in its leases of such machines a proviso binding the lessee to use only
defendant's salt therein. The Salt Company sold $500,000 worth of
salt for use in these machines in 1944. Without discussing percentiles,
the Court held the contracts violative of the Clayton Act, saying "Not
only is price-fixing unreasonable, per se, ... but also it is unreasonable,
per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market. . . . The
volume of business affected by these contracts cannot be said to be
insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency of the arrangement to
accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious."24 This case marked the
acceptance by the Supreme Court of the doctrine previously advanced
in several decisions handed down by the Circuit Courts of Appeals, the
first of which was Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp. 25 In
that case, the offending patentee had licensed its patents to customers
under four different types of agreements, three of which contained
covenants that the licensee would not use any products but those of the
patentee in conjunction with the patented processes. The fourth contained no such proviso, but called for triple royalties if materials used
were purchased from others. The practice was held to violate section
3, despite the fact that the patentee controlled only I% of the market.
On the other hand, cases involving exclusive dealing contracts have
uniformly shown signs of careful market analysis and scrutiny of the
circumstances peculiar to the industry before making a decision as to
the predictable effect of the practice. The final prediction has consistently been phrased in terms of probability. Among the various
factors which have been considered pertinent as tests of legality are
the market position of the seller,26 the difficulty of operation without
2s 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947).
24 Jd. at 396.
25 (C.C.A. 6th,

1936) 83 F. (2d) 764; see Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. F.T.C.,
(C.C.A. 4th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 48; Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 1st,
1945) 150 F. (2d) 952, cert. den. 326 U.S. 776, 66 S.Ct. 267 (1945).
2 6 Standard Fashion Company v. Magrane-Houston Company, 258 U.S. 346, 42 S.Ct.
360 (1922); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 703
(1941); Butterick Co. v. F.T.C., _(C.C.A. 2d, 1925) 4 F. (2d) 910, cert. den. 267 U.S.
602, 45 S.Ct. 462 (1925).
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the seller's products,27 the past effect on competition,28 and the purpose
behind the utilization of such a marketing device. 29 Thus, in Standard
Fashion Company v. Magrane-Houston Company,30 the Court emphasized the fact that the seller controlled 40% of the retail outlets for
patterns in the country, and laid down a test of probability, saying:
"Section 3 condemns sales or agreements where the effect of such
sale or contract of sale 'may' be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create monopoly. . . . But we do not think that the
purpose in using the word 'may' was to prohibit the mere possibility of the consequences described. It was intended to prevent
sucli agreements as would under the circumstances disclosed
probably lessen competition, or create an actual tendency to
monopoly. That it was not intended to reach every remote lessening of competition is shown in the requirements that such lessening must be substantial."31
The Court then found that such probability existed, reasoning that
the control of outlets plus the circumst~nces of the industry facilitated
the development of local monopolies.32 In contrast with this decision
is B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,33 where the
main factors in deciding that the contracts were not violative of the
Clayton Act were that the seller produced only I% of the total margarine production of the country and that the past history of the
industry revealed that such contracts were not in fact damaging to
competition. In other cases the decisive factor has been that the seller
21 Carter Carburetor Corp. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 8th, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 722; F.T.C. v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 43 S.Ct. 450 (1923); B.S. Pearsall Butter Co. v.
F.T.C., (C.C.A. 7th, 1923) 292 F. 720.
2s Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., (C.C.A. 7th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 641, affd.
299 U.S. 3, 57 S.Ct. 1 (1936); Butterick Co. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 2d, 1925) 4 F. (2d)
910, cert. den. 267 U.S. 602, 45 S.Ct. 462 (1925); B.S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. F.T.C.,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1923) 292 F. 720; Lipson v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., (C.C.A. 1st, 1937) 87 F.
(2d) 265, cert. granted 300 U.S. 651, 57 S.Ct. 612 (1937), dismissed by stipulation of
counsel 301 U.S. 711, 57 S.Ct. 788 (1937).
29 Carter Carburetor Corp. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 8th, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 722; Pick Mfg.
Co. v. General Motors Corp., (C.C.A. 7th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 641, affd. 299 U.S. 3, 57
S.Ct. 1 (1936).
30 258 U.S. 346, 42 S.Ct. 360 (1922).
31 Id. at 356-57. Italics added.
3 2 The Court stressed the following quotation from the opinion of the circuit court of
appeals: "The restriction of each merchant to one pattern manufacturer must in hundreds,
perhaps in thousands, of small communities amount to giving such single pattern manufacturer a monopoly of the business in the community. Even in the larger cities, to limit to a
single pattern maker the pattern business of dealers most resorted to by customers whose
purchases tend to give fashions their vogue, may tend to facilitate further combinations; so
that the plaintiff, or some other aggressive concern, instead of controlling two-fifths, will
shortly have almost, if not quite, all the pattern business." Standard Fashion Company v.
Magrane-Houston Company, (C.C.A. 1st, 1919) 259 F. 793 at 798.
83 (C.C.A. 7th, 1923) 292 F. 720.
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imposing the conditions was in such a position as to make it imperative
that the buyer purchase some of his products34 on the theory that, with
such leverage, an unscrupulous seller could drive his competitors in
the sale of other goods out of the market. A distinction has been made
in the past between contracts of purchase for consumption and those
contemplating resale,3 6 on Justice Jackson's theory that in such cases
the essential competition is for the business of the ultimate consumer,
and that the only serious danger in the latter situation is that one producer may control so many retail outlets as to prevent the other producers from competing effectively for the consumer's favor. The effect
of such practices on the industry has consistently been held to be of
great importance.36 However, the maintenance of the status quo as to
market share certainly should not be deemed controlling in view of
the possible use for consolidation of a market once obtained and the
weakening of potential competition by increasing the risks of entry into
the industry.37 The possibilities of abuse have made the motive of the
user of such contracts an important test, 38 though certainly not as much
so as under the Sherman Act. On this issue, one good criterion in
determining the dominant motive (as well as the principal effect) between marketing utility and efficacy as a monopolistic device, is whether
the term conforms to the reasonable requirements of the industry. "As
a competition killer the long term contract is an effective weapon. One
could hardly have a more favored service contract than an agreement
for exclusive dealing ... and a quarter century of time to elapse before
one need to be concerned with new terms. . . . The security . . . has
been buttressed further by staggered expiration dates."39 However,
the relative market position of the seller has been the most important
single factor, since a dominant firm has the power to use these contracts to stamp out competition. 40
34 Carter Carburetor Corp. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 8th, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 722; Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 703 (1941).
ai; Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., (C.C.A. 7th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 641, affd.
299 U.S. 3, 57 S.Ct. 1 (1936). F.T.C. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 43 S.Ct.
450 (1923).
'
80 Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., (C.C.A. 7th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 641, affd.
299 U.S. 3, 57 S.Ct. 1 (1936); B.S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 7th, 1923) 292
F. 720; Butterick Co. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 2d, 1925) 4 F. (2d) 910, cert. den. 267 U.S.
602, 45 S.Ct. 462 (1925): United States v. Pullman Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp.
123.
87 See MILLER, UNFAIR CoMPllnTION 211 (1941).
as Carter Carburetor Corp. v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 8th, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 722.
39 United States v. Pullman Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 123 at 129.
40 See Stockhausen, "The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements
Contracts," 23 N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. Rllv. 412 at 428 (1948); comment, 49 CoL. L. Rllv. 241
at 246 (1949).
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Coming against such a background of previous decisions, the farreaching effect of the principal case must be immediately apparent.
Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp.,41 must now be regarded as
overruled in both its express holding that an increase in competition
throughout the period during which the contracts were in force precludes a finding that the contracts "may substantially lessen competition," and the implied holding that sales for resale were entitled to
more lenient treatment when the real competition was for the patronage
of the ultimate consumer. With it must fall the cases holding that a
necessary part of any prosecution under this section is a showing of
actual effects as demonstrated by the experience of competitors. The
double standard that had been set up, testing the legality of tying contracts by whether any quantitatively substantial amount of business was
involved and exclusive dealing contracts by the factors outlined in the
preceding paragraph, is now a thing of the past. The new test of
legality for all ·types of contracts covered by section 3 is whether they
affect a substantial volume of business.
It has been suggested that this holding amounts to a declaration
that a contract to handle the goods of only one supplier is illegal per
se.42 It is submitted that this does not necessarily follow. The substantial volume test would seem to permit the use of these contracts in
the promotional stage of a business and compel abandonment only
after a sizable market had been developed. Thus the contracts would
still be available to businessmen at the time when they are most
desirable and least restraining, that is, when they are being used to
create competition, and at the same time a trade practice would not be
developed which might later put newcomers at a disadvantage through
compelling the immediate establishment of an extensive chain of rival
distributive outlets in order to compete effectively.43

C. Effect on Other Fields of Antitrust Law
The same test as in section 3 reappears in section I(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, amending section 2 of the Clayton Act. 44 This
section makes it unlawful for any person to discriminate in price between purchasers "where the effect ... may be substantially to lessen
41 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 641, affd. 299 U.S. 3, 57 S.Ct. 1 (1936).
42 Justice Jackson's dissent, 337 U.S. 293 at 323, 69 S.Ct. 1051.
43 See Mn.r.En, UNFAIR CoMPETITION 212 (1941). Another factor is the waste

ing from the allocation of resources to such means of competing.
4449 Stat. L. 1526, §1 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §13.
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competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or
to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or
with customers of either of them." This section also has recently undergone a judicial revamping expanding its scope and easing the requirements of proof of a predictable deleterious effect on competition. It is
established that a showing of an actual lessening of competition ,vill
bring the conduct within the proscribed class.45 As under section 3,
the chief problem of interpretation is the meaning of "may substantially
tend to lessen."- In Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission,4 6 the Court adopted the test as applied in the Standard
Fashion case interpreting section 3, saying: " ... the use of the word
'may' was not to prohibit discriminations having 'the mere possibility'
of those consequences, but to reach those which would probably have
the defined effect on competition." Three years later the Court reinterpreted the provision as meaning, instead, that the discrimination
was illegal if there was a reasonable possibility that it may injure
competition.47 It is doubtful that the Standard Oil decision will have
any further liberalizing effect on the interpretation of this section. It is
submitted that the chief significance in this particular is that it is a
reaffirmance of the theory of the Morton case, both opinions seeming
to come from the same expansionist approach to the antitrust laws.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act48 employs the same test as to intercorporate stock holdings, providing that it shall be unlawful for one
corporation engaged in interstate commerce to acquire stock in another
corporation similarly engaged "where the effect of such acquisition
may be to substantially lessen competition between such corporations .
. . . " It is in this field of antitrust activity that the Standard Oil decision may be of the most significant collateral effect. What decisions
there are under this section indicate a rather strict interpretation of
the clause, applying the 'probability' test, and looking more for pres45 Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1929)
30 F. (2d) 234, cert. den. 279 U.S. 858, 49 S.Ct. 353 (1929).
4 6 324 U.S. 726 at 738, 65 S.Ct. 961 (1945). See also Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. F.T.C.,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 378, cert. den. 326 U.S. 735, reh. den. 326 U.S. 809 (1945),
where it was held that the clause was satisfied if the lower price tended to prevent competitors
from taking business away from the merchant which they might have gotten but for the
special price offered. Italics added.
47 Fed. Trade Comm. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 S.Ct. 822 (1948). Justice
Jackson dissented in that case also, joined by Justice Frankfurter (author of the majority
opinion in the principal case).
48 38 Stat. L. 731, §7 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §18.
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ently demonstrable results than for dangerous potentialities.40 Thus,
in International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,50 the Court
held the acquisition by one shoe manufacturer of all the stock in another shoe company marketing its product throughout the same area as
did the purchaser, not violative of section 7. The grounds for the
decision were that one product was designed primarily for appearance
and the other for service, and that the one company was in financial
difficulty at the time of acquisition, the Court saying: "Mere acquisition by one corporation of the stock of a competitor, even though it
result in some lessening of competition, is not forbidden; the act deals
only with such acquisitions as probably will result in lessening competition to a substantial degree . . . that is to say, to such a degree as
will injuriously affect the public."51 It seems quite plausible that a
relaxation of this test will be next in line, in view of the Standard Oil
and Morton decisions. When to these cases is added the fact that
many of the recent decisions of the federal courts demonstrate an increased sensitivity to all types of restraint and a determination to outlaw
these restraints despite their legality by previous standards,52 the combination of opportunity and inclination is sufficient to warrant an expectation of an early alteration of the law in the field of intercorporate
stock acquisition. If this comes about, the way may be open for the
Justice Department to reach the integrated corporate enterprises which
the Sherman Act has proved impotent to bridle, at least when expansion is carried on by merger rather than by sale of assets. This seems
all the more probable in light of the definite trend of the antitrust
decisions of the .present Court to the theory that the public interest is
49 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (C.C.A. 3d, 1933) 66 F.
(2d) 37, affd. without opinion by an equally divided Court, 291 U.S. 651, 54 S.Ct. 559
(1934), (held, the acquisition by one road of 49% of the stock of two competing roads not
a violation); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., (D.C. Ohio 1935) 11 F. Supp. 117
(no violation because still-existing competition within the industry was held to remove danger
of injury to the public). See also United States v. New England Fish Exchange, (D.C.,
Mass. 1919) 258 F. 732; and Aluminum Co. of America v. F.T.C., (C.C.A. 3d, 1922) 284
F. 401, cert. den. 261 U.S. 616, 43 S.Ct. 362 (1923). Both latter cases found violation in
actual cessation.
50 280 U.S. 291, 50 S.Ct. 89 (1930).
51 Id. at 298.
5 2 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942); Eastern
Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 955; United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416. See Zlinkoff, "Monopoly
Versus Competition: Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-trust, Trade-mark, and Unfair
Competition Suits,'' 53 YALE L. J. 514 (1944), for a discussion of the decade-long drive in
the federal courts for restriction of patent and trademark monopolies, and the trend to a more
expanded interpretation of the anti-trust laws.
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the one controlling factor in all these cases, and that this interest can
best be served by the establishment of as freely competitive an economic
system as possible, unhampered by statutory or contractual grants of
special dispensation.53

William R. Worth, S.Ed.
53 Zlinkoff, "Monopoly Versus Competition: Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-trust,
Trade-mark, and Unfair Competition Suits," 53 YALE L. J. 514 (1944); Berge, "Problems of
Enforcement and Interpretation of the Sherman Act," PAPERS AND PnoCEEDINGS OF THE
SxxnETH AmruAL MEETING oF THE AMERICAN EcoNoMic AssoCIATION 172 (1948).

